J. William Fulbright

J. William Fulbright

J. William Fulbright, conocido como uno de los senadores más influyentes en la historia de Estados Unidos, se desempeñó como presidente del Comité de Relaciones Exteriores del Senado desde 1959 hasta 1974, el líder más antiguo del grupo. Como miembro de la Cámara de Representantes, recibió atención nacional por primera vez cuando fue autor de la Resolución Fulbright en 1942, que alentó la participación de Estados Unidos en lo que luego se convertiría en las Naciones Unidas.Primeros añosJames William Fulbright nació el 9 de abril de 1905 en Sumner, Missouri. Con aspiraciones de marcar una diferencia positiva en el mundo, asistió por primera vez a la Universidad de Arkansas, donde recibió el B.A. Cuando Fulbright regresó a los Estados Unidos, estudió derecho en la Universidad George Washington en Washington, D.C. La década de 1930 resultó ser el punto de partida de Fulbright en una carrera de persuasión moral y conciliación. El año 1936 lo llevó a su hogar en Arkansas, donde fue profesor de derecho (1939 a 1941) en la Universidad de Arkansas, convirtiéndose rápidamente en presidente de esa institución.Un hombre con una misionEn 1946, el exitoso profesor y ex rector de la universidad desarrolló el Programa Fulbright que financió reparaciones de guerra y reembolsos de préstamos extranjeros a Estados Unidos. Mientras era presidente del Comité de Relaciones Exteriores del Senado, Fulbright escribió una crítica cáustica, titulada La arrogancia del poderFulbright también advirtió sobre los resultados inminentes de la aprobación de la Resolución del Golfo de Tonkin en 1964 que condujo a una mayor escalada de la guerra de Vietnam. Fulbright dejó el Senado en 1974, luego de ser derrotado en las primarias demócratas por el entonces gobernador Dale Bumpers. El ex senador J. William Fulbright murió de un derrame cerebral el 9 de febrero de 1995, a la edad de 89 años en su casa en Washington, D.C.

A lo largo de nuestra historia, dos vertientes han convivido con inquietud; una hebra dominante de humanismo democrático y una hebra menor, pero duradera, de puritanismo intolerante. Ha habido una tendencia a lo largo de los años a que prevalezca la razón y la moderación mientras las cosas vayan bastante bien o mientras nuestros problemas parezcan claros, finitos y manejables. Pero ... cuando algún evento o líder de opinión ha despertado a la gente a un estado de alta emoción, nuestro espíritu puritano ha tendido a abrirse paso, llevándonos a mirar el mundo a través del prisma deformante de un moralismo áspero y colérico. - La arrogancia del poder, J. William Fulbright, 1966.

J. William Fulbright

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J. William Fulbright, en su totalidad James William Fulbright, (nacido el 9 de abril de 1905, Sumner, Missouri, EE. UU.; fallecido el 9 de febrero de 1995, Washington, D.C.), senador estadounidense que inició el programa de intercambio internacional para académicos conocido como la beca Fulbright. También es conocido por sus críticas vocales y articuladas a la participación militar de Estados Unidos en Vietnam del Sur durante su mandato como presidente del Comité de Relaciones Exteriores del Senado.

Fulbright se graduó de la Universidad de Arkansas y luego fue a Oxford, donde obtuvo dos títulos, como becario Rhodes. De regreso a los Estados Unidos, recibió su título de abogado en la Universidad George Washington (Washington, D.C.) y enseñó derecho en la Universidad de Arkansas, donde se desempeñó como presidente de esta última de 1939 a 1941.

En 1942 Fulbright ganó un escaño como demócrata en la Cámara de Representantes, iniciando así una carrera política que duraría más de tres décadas. Su logro más notable en la Cámara fue la Resolución Fulbright de 1943, que dejó constancia de que la Cámara favorecía la participación de Estados Unidos en una organización internacional de posguerra. Esta organización en su fundación en 1945 fue nombrada Naciones Unidas.

En 1944 Fulbright se postuló con éxito para el Senado. Al año siguiente, inició la Ley Fulbright, estableciendo un programa de intercambio educativo para académicos entre los Estados Unidos y países extranjeros.

Fulbright votó en contra de la financiación de las investigaciones anticomunistas del senador Joseph R. McCarthy, una acción que lo hizo popular entre los liberales. Sin embargo, se opuso constantemente a los esfuerzos para integrar las escuelas y promover los derechos civiles de los negros, lo que hizo posible que fuera reelegido de Arkansas en 1950, 1956, 1962 y 1968.

Como presidente del Comité de Relaciones Exteriores del Senado (1959-1974), Fulbright aconsejó al presidente Kennedy que no invadiera Cuba y se opuso enérgicamente a la intervención del presidente Johnson en 1965 en la República Dominicana.

El público estadounidense llegó a conocer mejor a Fulbright por su sondeo y su oposición articulada a la guerra de Vietnam, a pesar de que inicialmente apoyó la participación de Estados Unidos. De hecho, como viejo amigo y ex colega del presidente Johnson en el Senado, Fulbright había guiado la Resolución del Golfo de Tonkin a través del Senado. En 1966, sin embargo, su comité celebró audiencias televisadas sobre la participación militar de Estados Unidos en el sudeste asiático, de las cuales emergió como uno de los principales defensores del fin del bombardeo estadounidense de Vietnam del Norte y de las conversaciones de paz para resolver el conflicto vietnamita.

Fulbright fue derrotado en la contienda primaria demócrata de Arkansas para el Senado en 1974, y se retiró más tarde ese año. Presentó sus puntos de vista sobre la política exterior de Estados Unidos en varios libros, entre ellos Viejos mitos y nuevas realidades (1964), La arrogancia del poder (1966) y El gigante lisiado (1972).

Este artículo fue revisado y actualizado más recientemente por Amy Tikkanen, Gerente de Correcciones.


Panel: Retire la estatua de Fulbright, nombre del campus de Arkansas

FAYETTEVILLE, Ark. - Un comité de la Universidad de Arkansas dice que los homenajes en honor a un exsenador, alumno y segregacionista cuyas creencias no se alinean con los valores de la institución en la actualidad deberían ser retirados del campus.

El comité consideró la postura de J. William Fulbright sobre la integración y los derechos civiles en las décadas de 1950 y 1960 antes de recomendar que se retire su estatua y se elimine su nombre de la facultad de artes y ciencias de la universidad, informó Arkansas Democrat-Gazette.

Fulbright se graduó de la UA y se desempeñó como presidente de la universidad durante tres años a partir de 1939. Es conocido en todo el mundo por crear una beca de educación internacional en su nombre.

“Hubo un tiempo en que los estudiantes negros no eran bienvenidos en nuestro campus”, dijo el comité luego de su revisión del legado de Fulbright. “J. William Fulbright, mientras era senador, votó en contra de los intereses de los estudiantes negros y apoyó valores contrarios a la universidad. Para muchos, la estatua es un monumento a esos valores segregacionistas y un recordatorio diario para nuestros estudiantes negros de esa época ".

El comité, compuesto por estudiantes, ex alumnos, profesores y personal, también recomendó que se retirara el nombre del exgobernador de Arkansas Charles Brough de un comedor del campus debido a su papel en la Masacre de Elaine de 1919, uno de los asesinatos masivos raciales más grandes en la historia de Estados Unidos. .

“El comité reconoce que estas recomendaciones por sí solas no transformarán a la Universidad de Arkansas en un campus totalmente equitativo y antirracista. No obstante, los monumentos públicos, las estatuas y las dedicatorias deben cambiarse si refuerzan el racismo histórico ”, afirmó el comité.

En un comunicado publicado el miércoles en el sitio web de la universidad, el canciller Joe Steinmetz dijo que la universidad recopilaría comentarios y consideraría los aportes y perspectivas de otras partes interesadas de la universidad, incluidos profesores, personal, exalumnos y estudiantes.

La retroalimentación concluiría a fines de mayo y cualquier cambio debería ser aprobado por la junta de fideicomisarios del sistema universitario, se lee en el comunicado.

"Este asunto se complica por las profundas conexiones del senador Fulbright con el estado y la universidad, y las importantes contribuciones internacionales, al mismo tiempo reconociendo que el nombre causa dolor a algunos en nuestro campus, lo cual es lamentable", dijo Steinmetz.

El senador Mark Johnson advirtió que un proyecto de ley que aún no se ha convertido en ley restringiría la remoción de monumentos públicos.

"El proyecto de ley no estaba dirigido específicamente a esa ni a ninguna otra estatua", dijo Johnson. “Protege la estatua del senador Fulbright, protege los monumentos confederados, protege el monumento a los Nueve de Little Rock en los terrenos del Capitolio”.

El proyecto de ley permitiría peticiones a la Comisión Histórica de Arkansas en busca de aprobación para remover monumentos.

El portavoz de la UA, Mark Rushing, dijo en un correo electrónico que "la universidad seguirá la ley con respecto a cualquier recomendación o decisión sobre estos asuntos".

Daniel Webster, presidente de la Asociación de Estudiantes Negros de la UA y miembro del comité, dijo si se siguen las recomendaciones o cuáles son los próximos pasos, “al menos sabremos cómo se sintió el comité en los próximos años, y creo que fue realmente importante ".


La Universidad de Arkansas puede mover la estatua de William Fulbright, fallecido senador y mentor de Bill Clinton

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Según los informes, el rector de la Universidad de Arkansas se reunió con legisladores estatales esta semana para escuchar sus preocupaciones sobre la posible reubicación de una estatua en el campus del difunto senador James William Fulbright, el antiguo mentor de Bill Clinton a quien el expresidente pronunció un elogio. en su funeral.

La reunión que el canciller Joseph Steinmetz tuvo el martes en Little Rock duró aproximadamente una hora, informó KHBS, y se produjo semanas después de que dirigiera una carta al presidente del sistema universitario recomendando que la estatua de Fulbright erigida fuera del edificio más antiguo del campus de Fayetteville se trasladara a otro lugar ". otra ubicación apropiada del campus ".

"Hay que mantener la historia", dijo Steinmetz a un grupo de legisladores, algunos de los cuales son graduados de la Universidad de Arkansas que se han mostrado en desacuerdo con mover la estatua de su ubicación actual, según KHBS.

La estatua de J. William Fulbright en el campus de la Universidad de Arkansas en Fayetteville. (Replay Photos / Getty Images) (Lance King / Replay Photos a través de Getty Images)

"Entonces, lo que realmente sugiero al recomendar eso al Dr. Bobbitt y a la junta es que no menospreciemos al Senador Fulbright en absoluto, sino que en realidad celebremos esa historia, sino que celebremos la historia completa de la historia, no solo las cosas que escogemos y elegimos. para hablar ", agregó. "Eso incluye todas las grandes cosas que hizo en las que son tremendas en número, pero también los fracasos que históricamente también tuvo".

Steinmetz dijo en su carta del 19 de mayo que la universidad había formado un comité para "evaluar el controvertido y complejo legado del senador J. William Fulbright en nuestro campus" y "para explorar si la estatua de Fulbright debería continuar ocupando un lugar en el centro del campus". . "

Dijo que los críticos de Fulbright señalan el historial de derechos civiles del senador, en particular su decisión de firmar el Manifiesto del Sur, una declaración que se opone al fallo histórico de la Corte Suprema en Brown contra la Junta de Educación, y la resistencia a los "Proyectos de ley de derechos civiles de 1957 y 1964, y votar en contra de la Ley de Derechos Electorales de 1965 ".

"Por otro lado, también debemos sopesar sus contribuciones como presidente de la Universidad y como senador de los Estados Unidos, incluida la oposición a la guerra de Vietnam y quizás su mayor legado, el Programa de Intercambio Internacional Fulbright, probablemente el más prestigioso y de mayor alcance. e importante programa de intercambio en el mundo ", dijo Steinmetz.

El rector también dijo que "algunos preferirían que la universidad elimine por completo la estatua en un intento de alejar aún más el campus del senador Fulbright", mientras que "otros sugieren que movamos la estatua de su ubicación actual para reducir la incomodidad que sienten algunos estudiantes". sentir de tener que pasar junto a él al entrar y salir de Old Main ".

Antes de convertirse en presidente, cuando Clinton era estudiante en la Universidad de Georgetown, trabajó como pasante para Fulbright, quien en ese momento dirigía el Comité de Relaciones Exteriores del Senado de los Estados Unidos.

"Venimos a celebrar y dar gracias por la extraordinaria vida de J. William Fulbright, una vida que cambió nuestro país y nuestro mundo para siempre y para mejor", había dicho Clinton al pronunciar el elogio de Fulbright en 1995. "En el trabajo que hizo , las palabras que pronunció y la vida que vivió, Bill Fulbright se enfrentó a las fuerzas más destructivas del siglo XX y luchó para promover sus más brillantes esperanzas ".

Clinton también elogió el Programa de Becas Fulbright como un "ejemplo perfecto de la fe de Bill Fulbright, diferentes tipos de personas que aprenden una al lado de la otra, construyen lo que él llama 'una capacidad de empatía, un disgusto por matar a otros hombres y una inclinación por la paz'. "

En su carta, Steinmetz le dijo al presidente del sistema universitario Donald Bobbitt que está haciendo una solicitud formal para reubicar la estatua en una ubicación indeterminada en el campus "donde la comunidad del campus y los visitantes pueden ir a ver y escuchar la historia completa de Fulbright".

"En última instancia, el objetivo y el deseo es crear un diálogo saludable, minimizar los sentimientos heridos y desafiar las falsas dicotomías: o estás en contra de Fulbright o eres racista", dijo Steinmetz. "Es más complicado que eso".


Fulbright y Vietnam

En 1964 Fulbright y la mayoría de los demás legisladores estadounidenses expresaron su firme apoyo a la introducción del presidente Lyndon Johnson (ver entrada) de las fuerzas estadounidenses en Vietnam del Sur. De hecho, el senador de Arkansas patrocinó la Resolución del Golfo de Tonkin, que Johnson utilizó más tarde como su autoridad legal para emprender la guerra contra Vietnam del Norte y sus aliados del Viet Cong. Esta resolución fue aprobada por el Congreso en agosto de 1964, después de que los barcos de la Armada de los Estados Unidos con base en Vietnam supuestamente fueran atacados por las fuerzas norvietnamitas. Autorizó a Johnson a tomar "todas las medidas necesarias" contra nuevos ataques. Hoy, sin embargo, la mayoría de los historiadores creen que los buques de la Armada de los EE. UU. Nunca fueron atacados.

"Cuando miro hacia atrás en [mi patrocinio de la Resolución del Golfo de Tonkin], no podría haber cometido un error mayor", declaró Fulbright en La mala guerra: una historia oral de la guerra de Vietnam. "Considero eso como mi mayor error en el Senado, creer lo que ellos [la administración Johnson] dijeron y no tomarlo con escepticismo y examinarlo. Hicieron parecer que esto era muy importante para apoyar al Presidente y que si tenía la respaldo de este gran país, que podríamos hacer entender a Vietnam del Norte que los Estados Unidos no pueden ser presionados de esta manera y que, de hecho, demandarían la paz, y terminaría la cosa [la guerra] allí. . No hay excusa para mi estupidez al estar de acuerdo con la administración. No debería haber ... Me equivoqué y lo siento y eso es todo lo que puedo decir ".

En 1965, la administración Johnson comenzó a enviar tropas y armamento estadounidenses a Vietnam a un ritmo vertiginoso. Por esta misma época, Fulbright comenzó a expresar dudas privadas sobre la sabiduría de la creciente presencia militar de Estados Unidos en el conflicto y su capacidad para ganar la guerra rápidamente. También rechazó la descripción de la guerra de la administración Johnson como un choque de la Guerra Fría de gran importancia estratégica para los Estados Unidos. En cambio, Fulbright llegó a considerar la guerra como una lucha regional que debería ser resuelta por el pueblo vietnamita sin interferencia externa.

A finales de 1965, Fulbright decidió a regañadientes que necesitaba expresar en público sus crecientes preocupaciones sobre la guerra de Vietnam. "Fulbright temía la idea de provocar sobre sí mismo la tormenta de presión y controversia que sin duda se desencadenaría al criticar públicamente las políticas de guerra de un presidente todavía popular", escribió Eugene Brown en J. William Fulbright: Asesoramiento y disensión. "Sin embargo, no pudo reprimir por mucho más sus propias dudas sobre la sabiduría de comprometer el poder y el prestigio de Estados Unidos a la determinación militar de lo que estaba llegando a ver como un conflicto político localizado".


Minuto de historia: Fulbright hace del mundo un salón de clases

Cada año, miles de estudiantes universitarios tienen la oportunidad de continuar sus estudios fuera de sus países de origen a través de un programa diseñado por un educador y político de Arkansas.

El programa Fulbright Scholar se ha convertido en uno de los esfuerzos de estudio más prestigiosos gracias al veterano senador estadounidense J. William Fulbright de Fayetteville, quien creó el programa en 1946. Sus experiencias como estudiante y como educador lo convencieron de la importancia de expandir el horizontes de los jóvenes académicos tanto como sea posible.

James William Fulbright nació en Sumner, una pequeña comunidad agrícola en el centro de Missouri, en 1905. En un año, su familia se mudó a Fayetteville, donde su padre controlaba sus intereses comerciales en banca, embotellado y madera. La educación siempre fue una parte importante de la vida de Fulbright. Asistió a la clase de jardín de infantes experimental en la Universidad de Arkansas cuando era niño, cuando el jardín de infantes era casi inaudito.

Cuando era joven, asistió a la universidad y finalmente obtuvo un título en historia.

Posteriormente, Fulbright obtuvo una beca Rhodes para estudiar en la Universidad de Oxford en Gran Bretaña. El programa había sido establecido en 1902 por Cecil Rhodes, un explorador, político y propietario de una mina británico que había hecho una fortuna en África. La codiciada beca se ofrece a aproximadamente cien estudiantes de todo el mundo cada año.

Sus experiencias como estudiante en Oxford le abrieron los ojos a un amplio mundo de experiencias mucho más allá de su crianza en un pequeño rincón de Arkansas que jamás había ofrecido. Oxford, la universidad más antigua de Inglaterra, durante ocho siglos educó a las mentes más brillantes y trajo estudiantes de toda Europa y, finalmente, del mundo para trabajar, aprender y vivir juntos. Obtuvo una maestría en Oxford en 1928 y pronto se inscribió en la Facultad de Derecho de la Universidad George Washington en Washington, DC, donde obtuvo el título de abogado en 1934.

Fulbright se desempeñó durante dos años como abogado antimonopolio para el Departamento de Justicia antes de regresar a Arkansas en 1936. Trabajó para la Universidad de Arkansas como profesor de derecho de 1936 a 1939. Ese año, el antiguo presidente de la universidad, John C. Futrall, murió en un accidente automovilistico. Los fideicomisarios de la universidad decidieron elegir un candidato interno para suceder a Futrall y rápidamente se decidieron por Fulbright. Como presidente, Fulbright vio a miles de estudiantes de todos los ámbitos de la vida pasar por la universidad y comprendió la importancia y el prestigio que ofrece una educación universitaria.

Cuando Fulbright fue elegido al Congreso durante la Segunda Guerra Mundial, trajo consigo una perspectiva internacional. En 1943, impulsó una resolución que pedía a Estados Unidos que creara nuevas organizaciones internacionales dedicadas a la paz, como las Naciones Unidas. La medida, más tarde llamada Resolución Fulbright, fue aprobada por 360 votos contra 29.

Cuando la guerra llegó a su fin, el senador recién elegido reconoció cuánto había cambiado el mundo. El viejo mundo se había ido, donde las naciones, las empresas y los académicos podían permanecer aislados del resto del mundo. En general, una paz duradera entre las naciones requería algo más que acuerdos entre políticos. La gente tenía que participar y la educación era la clave para la paz.

Siguiendo el modelo de la idea de Rhodes Scholar, Fulbright patrocinó la creación del Programa Fulbright Scholar para enviar estudiantes estadounidenses al extranjero y traer estudiantes internacionales a los Estados Unidos. La propuesta de Fulbright, de hecho, fue diseñada para llegar a muchos más estudiantes que el programa Rhodes Scholar. En el proceso, los estudiantes aprenderían sobre culturas extranjeras y, según creía Fulbright, sobre la importancia de los ideales democráticos estadounidenses.

Reflexionó sobre cuán diferente podría haber cambiado la política internacional si los adversarios de Estados Unidos hubieran estado expuestos a las ideas estadounidenses como parte de su educación.

“Qué maravilloso sería si el Sr. [Joseph] Stalin o el Sr. [Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores soviético Vyacheslav] Molotov hubieran podido ir ... a Colombia en su juventud”, comentó Fulbright mientras impulsaba la iniciativa.

Fulbright encontró una manera ingeniosa de financiar el nuevo y expansivo programa de becas internacionales con muy poco esfuerzo. El programa se financió inicialmente a través de la venta de suministros militares innecesarios y en exceso, es decir, excedentes de guerra, modificando ligeramente la Ley de propiedad excedente de 1944. La beca completa se administraría a través del departamento de estado.

El programa fue promulgado por el presidente Harry S. Truman el 1 de agosto de 1946.

El programa se convirtió rápidamente en un éxito monumental. El programa ha incluido en sus filas a 33 jefes de estado, 59 ganadores del Premio Nobel y 82 ganadores del Premio Pulitzer, fácilmente algunas de las mentes más influyentes de los últimos 70 años. El programa se ha ampliado para incluir también a investigadores y profesores.

Más de 300,000 estudiantes en todo el mundo han participado en el programa Fulbright, incluidos más de 120,000 solo de los Estados Unidos. Participan más de 150 naciones.

Fulbright permitió que el mundo se convirtiera en un aula. En el proceso, los estudiantes aprendieron no solo cómo construir sus propias vidas, sino también cómo trabajar con otros y preservar la paz.


Historia de la Comisión Fulbright de Bulgaria

& # 8220 El simple propósito del programa de intercambio ... es erosionar la desconfianza culturalmente arraigada que pone a las naciones unas contra otras. El programa de intercambio no es una panacea sino una vía de esperanza. & # 8221

Senador J William Fulbright

El programa Fulbright

En septiembre de 1945, a raíz de los horrores de la Segunda Guerra Mundial, el senador James William Fulbright (D-Arkansas) presentó un proyecto de ley que establecía un programa de intercambio académico internacional que se financiaría mediante la eliminación de las propiedades estadounidenses durante la guerra en Europa. El proyecto de ley se aprobó sin debate y fue promulgado por el presidente Truman el 1 de agosto de 1946. Los intercambios educativos se consolidaron durante la presidencia de John F. Kennedy bajo la Ley Mutua de Educación y Cultura de 1961, presentado por el Senador Fulbright en el Senado y el Representante Wayne Hays de Ohio en la Cámara. Esta ley, aún vigente en la actualidad, se conoce como Ley Fulbright-Hays. Su objetivo principal es "Permitir que el Gobierno de los Estados Unidos aumente el entendimiento mutuo entre el pueblo de los Estados Unidos y el pueblo de otros países mediante el intercambio educativo y cultural para fortalecer los lazos que nos unen con otras naciones demostrando los intereses educativos y culturales, desarrollos y logros del pueblo de los Estados Unidos y las otras naciones, y las contribuciones que se están haciendo hacia una vida pacífica y más fructífera para las personas en todo el mundo para promover la cooperación internacional para el avance educativo y cultural y así ayudar en el desarrollo de amistades relaciones comprensivas y pacíficas entre los Estados Unidos y otros países del mundo ".

En la actualidad, Fulbright es el programa de intercambio internacional más reconocido y prestigioso del mundo. Durante las últimas siete décadas, el Programa Fulbright ha permitido que más de 360 ​​000 personas participen en el intercambio Fulbright. El Programa Fulbright otorga aproximadamente 8,000 subvenciones al año, buscando personas con potencial que representen la diversidad total de sus respectivas sociedades y seleccionando nominados a través de concursos abiertos basados ​​en el mérito.

Muchos ex alumnos Fulbright se han convertido en figuras destacadas en el gobierno, la ciencia, las artes, los negocios y la educación: 30 ex alumnos Fulbright se han desempeñado como jefes de estado en sus países de origen Los ex alumnos Fulbright han recibido 53 premios Nobel y 88 premios Pulitzer, 29 han recibido MacArthur Premios de la Fundación “Genio”, y 16 han sido galardonados con la Medalla Presidencial de la Libertad.

El Programa Fulbright es administrado en los Estados Unidos por la Oficina de Asuntos Educativos y Culturales del Departamento de Estado de los Estados Unidos a través de agencias cooperantes, como el Instituto de Educación Internacional (IIE) y el Consejo para el Intercambio Internacional de Académicos (CIES). La Junta de Becas Extranjeras J. William Fulbright (FSB), que consta de doce miembros nombrados por el presidente, proporciona pautas de política para el intercambio educativo. En el exterior, el Programa Fulbright es administrado en 50 países por comisiones binacionales que implementan el principio de binacionalismo enfatizado fuertemente por el mismo Senador Fulbright: “No había querido que esto fuera únicamente un programa estadounidense ... En cada país, las comisiones binacionales debían desarrollar el tipo de programa que tuviera sentido para ellas & # 8211 qué tipo de estudiantes, o maestros y profesores, deberían seleccionarse, qué tipo del trabajo de investigación ".

La principal fuente de financiación del Programa Fulbright es una asignación anual del Congreso de los Estados Unidos. La asignación del Congreso para el Programa Fulbright en el año fiscal 2015 fue de $ 236 millones. Los gobiernos, las fundaciones y las instituciones anfitrionas participantes en países extranjeros y los Estados Unidos también contribuyen financieramente a través de costos compartidos y apoyo indirecto.

Comisión Búlgaro-Americana para el Intercambio Educativo

Comisión Búlgaro-Americana para el Intercambio Educativo

La Comisión Búlgaro-Americana para el Intercambio Educativo (Comisión Fulbright de Bulgaria) fue inaugurada oficialmente el 9 de febrero de 1993, en virtud de un acuerdo bilateral de diez años entre los Gobiernos de los Estados Unidos y la República de Bulgaria. El 3 de diciembre de 2003, se firmó un nuevo acuerdo bilateral entre los Gobiernos de los Estados Unidos y la República de Bulgaria estableciendo la Comisión Fulbright a perpetuidad. La Comisión está formada por diez miembros, cinco ciudadanos estadounidenses y cinco ciudadanos búlgaros. Representan las principales áreas de actividad estatal y pública: gobierno, educación, artes y negocios. El Embajador de los Estados Unidos en la República de Bulgaria y el Ministro de Educación y Ciencia de la República de Bulgaria actúan como presidentes honorarios de la Comisión.

La principal fuente de financiación para el Programa y la Comisión Fulbright en Bulgaria es una asignación anual del gobierno de EE. UU. De aproximadamente $ 600.000 y, desde 2009, una contribución anual del gobierno búlgaro de $ 140.000. La Fundación America for Bulgaria ha apoyado generosamente la expansión del programa de Asistente de Enseñanza de Inglés Fulbright de Bulgaria desde 2010.

La función principal de la Comisión se deriva directamente de los objetivos del Programa Fulbright en todo el mundo y consiste en administrar el intercambio de académicos, estudiantes, asistentes de enseñanza y profesionales búlgaros y estadounidenses y brindar asesoramiento educativo sobre oportunidades de estudio en los EE. UU.

Antes del establecimiento de la Comisión, el intercambio Fulbright en Bulgaria existía en una escala limitada: entre 1967 y 1993 había 102 becarios búlgaros y unos 80 estadounidenses Fulbright. El número total de becarios Fulbright búlgaros y estadounidenses desde 1967 es de 1187. De ellos, 560 son búlgaros y 627 estadounidenses.


Palabras clave

Porque si no inventamos con precisión ninguno de los instrumentos que estas nuevas naciones están utilizando ahora, ilustramos sus potencialidades más plenamente y, creo, en general, más feliz y exitosamente que cualquier otra nación. Estados Unidos fue la primera nación que se fundó directamente sobre el derecho a la revolución, es decir, el derecho a "alterar o abolir el gobierno e instituir un nuevo gobierno". ... Lo que era cierto en 1787 es, creo, cierto en 1967.

—Henry Steele Commager, 1967 Nota al pie 1

En el siglo XVII América escapó del mundo, en el siglo XX se vio obligada a regresar a él.

El tumulto de 1968 sacudió al mundo. La guerra de Vietnam se había convertido en uno de los conflictos más divisivos en la historia de los Estados Unidos, y el fuerte aumento de la participación militar estadounidense en el sudeste asiático provocó protestas y un reexamen crítico del racismo, el militarismo y el capitalismo en el país y en el extranjero. No es de extrañar, entonces, que en el invierno de 1968, el mismo momento de la ofensiva del Tet y la famosa crítica del presentador de noticias de CBS Walter Cronkite a la conducción de la guerra, el veterano presidente del Comité de Relaciones Exteriores del Senado (SCFR) J. William Fulbright convocó a expertos para que testifiquen en una serie de audiencias públicas sobre la guerra de Vietnam y la política exterior estadounidense. A estos académicos reunidos se les encargó no examinar las minucias de la estrategia y tácticas estadounidenses en Vietnam, sino abordar un tema más fundamental: ¿cuál era “la naturaleza de la revolución”? Nota a pie de página 3 Los convocantes pretendían que las audiencias "La naturaleza de la revolución" consideraran si Vietnam era una situación revolucionaria. Sin embargo, una lectura atenta de las audiencias también reveló una preocupación mucho más interesante: ¿la fe compartida en la nobleza de la propia herencia revolucionaria de los Estados Unidos ayudó u obstaculizó a los tomadores de decisiones políticas de la nación en la comprensión de las aspiraciones revolucionarias de los demás?

Al tratar de comprender e informar sus perspectivas sobre Vietnam y los límites del poder de Estados Unidos, la SCFR descubrió los legados controvertidos de la Revolución Americana. The proceedings revealed a significant contradiction: while Americans exalted in their own revolutionary heritage and sincerely believed the republic an example to the world, they simultaneously held that the American revolutionary experience was not replicable due to the unique circumstances of the late 1700s and the exceptional skills of the founding generation. Hearings participants anticipated that the U.S. experience and understanding of its own revolutionary past should enable a policy better able to handle the revolutionary impulses of others, and yet the opposite proved more often the case.

Responding in part to a challenge to seek new directions in the study of the Revolutionary Era and Early Republic, particularly its “contemporary invocations,” this article presents one look at an underexplored theme in the history of U.S. foreign relations: a marked ambivalence toward twentieth-century sociopolitical revolutions, and the consequences of this contradictory posture for the nation's self-image and foreign policy. Footnote 4 Indeed, the Nature of Revolution testimonies elicited elite perspectives on the American Revolution and its relationship with late 1960s U.S. foreign policy—perspectives best characterized as neither pro- nor counter-revolutionary, but of revolutionary ambivalence. While Fulbright posed the question of the nature of revolution, two prominent Harvard professors, historian Crane Brinton and political scientist Louis Hartz, answered it. Though respected in their fields, neither was a specialist on Vietnam, Southeast Asia, or even U.S. foreign relations. While other testimonies focused on Vietnamese nationalism, Brinton and Hartz expressed significant anxiety about the legitimacy of other people's revolutions and the capacities of non-Americans for true revolutionary change. These issues had a long history in the United States, of course, from the Jefferson–Adams debates over the French Revolution through the Eisenhower administration's preoccupations with Fidel Castro. Footnote 5 A close reading of these hearings illuminates this revolutionary ambivalence and informs models for how to understand the Vietnam War.

The earliest histories of the American Revolution, such as those written by David Ramsay in 1789 and Mercy Otis Warren in 1805, described it as a glorious cause for liberty and against British perfidy, helping to create a now-familiar noble narrative. As the nation expanded, however, the quest for a nationalist creation story and a usable past intensified. Footnote 6 As Joyce Appleby has noted, the generation born between Independence and 1800 “some enthusiastically, others reluctantly—took on the self-conscious task of elaborating the meaning of the American Revolution.” Footnote 7 For the next generation of historians, the Revolution acquired a religious dimension, becoming the end point of a providential plan to bring light to the New World. This Whig interpretation remained in vogue until the turn of the twentieth century (indeed, echoes of this interpretation are still found in populist accounts today). Footnote 8 From military generals to political elites to yeoman farmers, the colonists were depicted as united in their opposition to British colonial “slavery,” in their revulsion toward tyranny, and in their intrinsic understanding of the historical significance of the nation that emerged. Footnote 9

Not until the Progressive Era was the Whig interpretation seriously challenged. As urbanization, industrialization, immigration, and World War I transformed the United States, Progressive historians looked back and spied similar class and ethnic conflicts in the Revolutionary Era. Scholars such as Charles Beard, Arthur M. Schlesinger, and J. Franklin Jameson explored linkages among geography, demographics, and economics, and analyzed the tensions between “sections” and special interests in the creation of the nation. Footnote 10 Progressive historians also questioned the supposed radicalism of the founding era, arguing that a domestic elite had replaced their foreign precursors without dramatically changing an American society riddled with economic tensions. Footnote 11

With the end of World War II emphasis returned to points of commonality among Americans. Footnote 12 This so-called Consensus School inflected many aspects of intellectual life, including politics, government, jurisprudence, and the social sciences. When the consensus historians of the 1950s and early 1960s turned their analytical lenses to the American Revolution, they emphasized the roles of sober, propertied men, entirely rational in their fight for home rule. Mindful of the all-consuming ideological and political battle with the Soviet Union, early Cold War historians of the Revolution emphasized the Founders’ adherence to the rule of law, the slow yet steady march of democracy, the definitive character of American liberalism, and the lack of truly divisive issues in American life. Footnote 13 But events in the late 1960s—among them rising revolutionary rhetoric and the proliferation of national liberation movements and potentially revolutionary situations across the globe—challenged these assumptions and raised new questions about decolonization, radical change, and the role the United States should play as a global superpower. Footnote 14 The fallout from the Vietnam War lent further urgency to the question.

More than four decades after the fall of Saigon, the war continues to fascinate and divide Americans (witness the popular and academic reactions to Ken Burns and Lynn Novick's 2017 PBS series The Vietnam War). Footnote 15 Changing sociopolitical experiences, access to fresh sources, and new academic approaches have meanwhile inspired a new generation of Vietnam War historiography. Footnote 16 Yet much of the writing on Vietnam remains shaped by two narratives: a mainstream academic “orthodox” perspective, which holds that the war was largely ill-advised and a lost cause, and a “revisionist” view, typically associated with military perspectives, in which the war was necessary and winnable but for the loss of support at home. Footnote 17

Turning to a close analysis of the impacts of the discursive and affective legacies of the American Revolution on later U.S. foreign relations, particularly in the twentieth century, offers a new narrative framework and a new set of questions to ask about the Vietnam War, questions underexplored by historians but clearly on the minds of elite thinkers at the time of the SCFR hearings. First, was Vietnam a true nationalist revolution, rather than a site of foreign communist agitation? Second, how was the support of the right to nationalist revolt to be balanced with fears of communist infiltration and the disruption of the global order? Third, did the United States's own revolutionary heritage provide special insights into the roots and validity of sociopolitical upheavals in other states? And finally, did the legacy of the American Revolution imply a responsibility to support other nationalist revolutions? The issue was therefore not only the nature and perceived legitimacy of other people's revolutions, but how Americans felt about revolutions as a whole, including their own. Footnote 18 The answers brought to light a profound revolutionary ambivalence that helps explain the sharp moral contradiction of a nation that oscillated between expounding the virtues of liberty and self-determination on the one hand and impeding movements for national liberation in the name of order and anti-communism on the other. The persistence of revolution as a category of contentious politics, the Cold War–decolonization nexus, and the nation's revolutionary ambivalence meant that for U.S. foreign policy elites, revolutions were, in the words of Louis Hartz, a problem “entangled with our destiny.” Footnote 19

As President Lyndon Johnson escalated and Americanized the war in Vietnam, members of Congress took note. Whether Johnson's freedom to maneuver was circumscribed by Kennedy's legacy and the hawkish wing of the Democratic Congress or by his own hubris, officials explained the expanding engagement in Vietnam in internationalist terms. The credibility of Johnson's presidency and of the Democratic Party, as well as the U.S.'s ability to act as guarantor of the international order, were at stake and the pressure was felt acutely throughout the administration. Footnote 20 But as the fighting in Vietnam became costlier and more visible, it prompted a sustained examination of U.S. policy. As Chair of the SCFR, Fulbright considered it his duty to keep a sharp eye on the nation's foreign interventions.

Fulbright remains an enigmatic character in twentieth century U.S. political history. Footnote 21 On questions of race, Fulbright was a quintessential Southern Democrat the junior senator from Arkansas signed the 1956 “Southern Manifesto” against mandatory racial integration in the wake of Brown contra la Junta de Educación (1954), filibustered the Civil Rights Acts of 1957 and 1964, and voted against the 1965 Voting Rights Act. Yet Fulbright proved iconoclastic on questions of foreign policy. He was a Wilsonian with similar racial prejudices and a comparable aversion to European imperialism, a perspective often shared by Southerners. Footnote 22 He was a keen supporter of international law and the United Nations. At a time when most Southern Democrats were zealous anti-communists, Fulbright clashed openly with both Senate McCarthyites and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles. In 1956, Harper's called the junior senator the “Arkansas Paradox.” Footnote 23 A decade later journalist Marquis Childs described Fulbright as a “bemused college professor,” concerned as a “humanitarian and a scholar” with the Johnson administration's “willingness to sacrifice human lives” over Vietnam. Footnote 24

Until the 1960s Fulbright was most famous for his eponymous educational exchange program and his oft-repeated belief in the redemptive powers of education. Footnote 25 He had established himself as a critic and intellectual who challenged what he considered to be the false assumptions distorting American foreign policy. On March 25, 1964, Fulbright addressed the Senate with a speech entitled “Old Myths and New Realities.” Due to human fragilities, there was always some “divergence” between the world as it was and the world “as men perceive it.” This was especially true in foreign policy, and particularly problematic for Americans “predisposed to regard any conflict as a clash between good and evil rather than as simply a clash between conflicting interests.” Footnote 26 The central “old myth” was that of a centralized communist conspiracy, with different actors and agents “all equally resolute and implacable in their determination to destroy the free world.” Footnote 27 Two years later, in his most well-known address, Fulbright lectured a Johns Hopkins audience on “The Arrogance of Power,” arguing that the U.S. was “in danger of losing its perspective on what exactly [was] within the realm of its power and what [was] beyond it.” Footnote 28 Fulbright insisted that the United States was powerful enough to have the “courage to be wrong” about its foreign relations. Footnote 29 When Fulbright finally broke with the administration over Vietnam, it was dramatic but not entirely unprecedented.

Fulbright the politician may have been an odd fit with his Senate colleagues and seemed to have a unique ability to alienate those closest to power, but Fulbright the political intellectual was a well-respected public figure in liberal internationalist circles. Footnote 30 To quote Walter Lippmann, “Fulbright is not listened to on the floor of Congress until he has been heard around the world.” Footnote 31 Hosting hearings was therefore entirely in keeping with Fulbright's conception of the role of a senator-as-intellectual and his desire to influence politics by shaping the conversation, rather than through legislative change or having the ear of decision makers. Footnote 32

After 1965, as U.S. military commitments in Vietnam escalated sharply, Fulbright used the chair's prerogative to convene a series of ongoing conversations about the use and misuse of American power in general, and about Johnson's Southeast Asia policies in particular. Fulbright turned to a rotating series of experts from government, the military, and academia. The hearings probed the “larger geopolitical and ideological rationale for and meaning of US involvement” and provided a window into a series of issues raised by the war, including the validity of the domino theory, whether or not American credibility hinged on defeating North Vietnam, why the nation's superior military technology was not producing the expected results, and the ultimate position of the United States in the story—defender of liberty or global bully? Footnote 33 Not just the concerns of the emergent antiwar left, these questions also troubled Congressional elites and high-ranking political actors.

Lofty goals notwithstanding, the hearings were often a mixed bag. Some were highly orchestrated political theater, interrogating high-ranking officials such as Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, with Fulbright conspicuously wearing dark glasses to shield himself from the television lights. Footnote 34 Others had fewer than ten people in the room and passed with little fanfare. Some explicitly focused on the prosecution of the war, such as John Kerry's April 1971 “Winter Soldier” testimony on behalf of Vietnam Veterans against the War. Footnote 35 Still others explicitly handled the broadest questions about U.S. history, the nation's values, and its changing role in a decolonizing world.

Throughout the twentieth century, movements for national liberation had increased, and sociopolitical revolution was once again a subject of popular and academic attention. Footnote 36 The 1960s and 1970s arguably represented the height of an increasingly global pan-liberationist cosmology, where the popular appeal of revolution was present everywhere from Paris to Mexico City and from Soweto to Harvard Yard. The rise of radical ideologies and practices also inspired American revolutionaries to pursue radical social transformations at home and abroad, and to stand in solidarity with revolutions in the decolonizing world.

Fulbright's hearings showcased how elite Americans tried to understand revolutionary upheaval with the assistance of academic specialists—a penchant that reflected the growing commitment to professionalization and positivist thinking that characterized post-1945 social science. Footnote 37 In 1967, for example, Fulbright invited prominent historian Henry Steele Commager to speak before the committee on the subject of “Changing American Attitudes Toward Foreign Policy.” Known for his critical liberal analyses, Commager was introduced by Fulbright as “one of our Nation's most celebrated scholars in the field of American history.” Commager was asked to comment on the history of U.S. foreign relations and on the nation's handling of its new global standing.

Commager forcefully declared that Americans had long recognized the necessity of limits to political power. Indeed, “our political philosophy … is a monument to the belief that power is limited, and that power should be limited.” And as power was constrained domestically through the elaborate system of checks and balances, so should it also be limited in foreign relations. In Commager's telling, the main traditions in American foreign relations history all reflected this respect for limits. The American Revolution was a response to the Declaratory Act of 1766, which had argued for the Crown's right to “bind the Colonies and people of America in all cases whatsoever.” George Washington's Neutrality Proclamation in 1793 limited American engagement in European affairs, and both the Monroe Doctrine and the Open Door could be interpreted as policies in which the United States encouraged European restraint, but also set global limits for itself. Commager also articulated the “accidental” explanation for the nation's overseas domain: Spanish territories were acquired in a “fit of absentmindedness” Cuba was “very sensibly” returned to the Cubans and Americans were “eager to get out” of the Philippines.

The United States's penchant for international restraint, then, had allowed it to “go before the world with clean hands, as it were: we do not have ‘colonies.’” Footnote 38 But Commager believed that the two world wars “inextricably” bound the United States to the affairs of Europe and the world, and had stretched traditions too far. Americans successfully helped Europe and Asia rebuild, but the policy of restraint was abandoned to the nation's detriment. Commager argued that it was now the United Nations's duty, not that of the United States, “to keep peace throughout the globe, to put down aggression wherever it starts up, to stop the advance of communism or other isms which we may not approve of.” Footnote 39

Commager's statement anticipated several core themes raised in the Nature of Revolution testimonies a year later. First was his argument that the careless deployment of American might around the globe represented a betrayal of American values. Second was Commager's insistence that participants take a wider historical perspective in their deliberations. The communist revolutions that so many policy makers interpreted as immediate threats to global stability were for others the natural culmination of centuries of oppression. As Commager reminded the assembled senators, “It was the West—not communist countries—that invented imperialism and invented colonialism.” And finally, Commager suggested that perhaps the United States owed the world a debt of revolution. The American Revolution was the preeminent example of radical, liberatory political transformation. As such, the U.S. had to bear some responsibility for the seismic change in the international system denoted by “the revolt of Asia and Africa against the West.… and the emergence into modernity of perhaps two-thirds of the peoples of the globe.” Footnote 40 As the “first people to create a nation,” Americans should be “infinitely sympathetic to the new nations of the world.” Instead, Commager concluded, the United States too often found itself opposed to revolution, to the great disenchantment of emerging nations, weakening the nation's moral authority. Footnote 41

In February and March 1968, the Foreign Relations Committee convened the Nature of Revolution hearings, and entertained the testimony of five academics from the fields of history, political science, and government. Footnote 42 The academics had a difficult task. They were summoned before a bipartisan, high-level Senate committee of career politicians not to discuss Vietnam strategy or Vietnamese nationalism, but to consider the far more ambiguous topic of revolution. Footnote 43 While three of the academics were present for their area expertise, Crane Brinton and Louis Hartz, like Commager before them, were called for their knowledge of history and government.

On Monday, February 19, Fulbright called the meeting to order:

The Committee on Foreign Relations this morning is beginning a series of public Hearings on the nature of revolutions and the significance of revolutions abroad for American foreign policy. The broad purpose of these open discussions is, first, to develop information about the tendency of revolutions, regardless of their ideological origins, to pass through certain relatively distinct stages, and, second, to try to identify the implications of the process in the context of the current and future formulation of foreign policy by the United States. Footnote 44

Brinton testified first. A specialist on revolutions and the history of France, known to combine sweeping historical analysis with observations of contemporary ethical and political issues, Brinton had offered a few general reflections on global affairs and U.S. policy in his publications. In 1947, in a collection of addresses delivered at Pomona College entitled From Many One: The Process of Political Integration, the Problem of World Government, he argued that the new challenges of the postwar era required the intervention of social scientists. Brinton quoted the chilling remark of an unnamed academic colleague: “We physical scientists have now succeeded in devising a way—several ways—to destroy the human race you social scientists have got to find a way to keep the human race from using the opportunity we have given it.” Brinton emphasized that historians had a necessary role in creating this new political age. Since all the “treaties, alliances, leagues, united nations [sic], and any other device for bringing sovereign states together” had not yet worked, it was up to historians to discern which aspects of political integration had worked in the past and could be adapted for a nuclear world. Footnote 45

For Brinton, there existed two grand models of political integration: imperialism (integration by force) and federalism (integration by consent), and neither was suitable for the postwar world. Imperialism was obviously problematic, as it relied on artificial hierarchies and coercion. Moreover, imperialism's legitimacy as a form of political organization had been severely damaged by the Second World War and was further threatened by rising Asian nationalism. Democratic federalism, the model pioneered by the United States, though superior to imperialism, was a poor fit for mid-twentieth-century political integration. The sociopolitical experiment of American federalism, which absorbed a once adversarial multitude of distinct European peoples into a “melting pot of races,” could not be replicated on the scale necessary for global peace. Footnote 46 To attempt such would be logistically impractical, as there were simply too many people in the world, “some twenty-two thousand million of them,” of differing political traditions and levels of development. As Brinton explained, even if one excluded the “black Africans and Polynesians, you can hardly rule out [the] Chinese, Japanese, and East Indians” from the new global political compact. Footnote 47 There lay the dilemma. If integration by force was out of the question, so then was control by the traditional imperial powers, France and Britain. The obvious alternative was U.S. global leadership, yet Americans were a distinct people who possessed neither the inclination nor “the stuff of imperialists.” Footnote 48 Brinton argued that a “pax Americana” was both inadvisable and impossible:

We Americans have many assets for the task, but I do not believe we could make a pax Americana for the globe. We have great energy, and we are today as ubiquitous in the furthest corners of the world as was once the Englishman. We have to the full the great Anglo-Saxon gift of identifying our desires with universal human obligations. We should never attempt, as Hitler did, to conquer cruelly for our own avowed good when we conquer people, or indeed have any dealing with them, we do so for their good. Footnote 49

There was an additional difficulty—nationalism. Here Brinton adopted the language of English writer Arthur Clutton-Brock, who in 1921 defined nationalism as “pooled self-esteem.” Footnote 50 Nationalism remained a constant, “not to be stamped out by conquest, nor even to be exorcised by professorial and editorial incantations.” In a gibe at the Cold War realists already dominating political discourse (Hans Morgenthau's Scientific Man versus Power Politics was published in 1946, Politics Among Nations followed in 1948), Brinton pointed out that “oppressed nationalities like the Irish and the Poles” were remarkably persistent in their refusal to be subsumed by stronger powers. Much to the annoyance of those “afflicted” with realism, “the human sentiments that bind men into nationalities are deep, slow to change, and like many other human sentiments, are often strengthened by attempts to suppress them.” Footnote 51 Thus, whatever form of political integration would save the world from further atomic terror would require “deliberate human volition” to eradicate “festering sores of unsatisfied nationalism, [and] irredenta, internal or external.” Footnote 52

The threat of unfulfilled nationalist aspirations and the irreplaceability of the American historical experience were key themes in Brinton's postwar work, but his 1938 title, The Anatomy of Revolution, made Brinton's academic reputation and formed the basis of his prepared remarks before the SCFR three decades later. Footnote 53 In his testimony Brinton reintroduced his famous medical metaphor, likening revolutions to a fever wherein discontent with the antiguo régimen festered until the elites defected and there developed widespread call for systemic change. Gradually, moderate reformers lost control to better organized radicals, who in turn lost control to the most violent extremists, precipitating social catastrophe (borrowing from the French Revolution, Brinton called this period a “reign of terror”). Footnote 54 After a period of convalescence, society settled back down, forever altered, but often not nearly as radically as the revolutionaries had initially hoped. Footnote 55 Anatomy of Revolution set the stage for decades of study on comparative revolutions. Brinton was not uncommon in his academic distaste for the French Revolution, but he was unique in that his ideas reached both academic and general audiences. Footnote 56

This broad pattern characterized all the great revolutions, excepto the American one, which Brinton described to the Foreign Relations Committee as a “successful nationalist revolution” to expel British rulers that Americans had come to view as foreigners in their midst. The American Revolution shared with other revolutions a transfer of allegiance from the legitimate authority in the imperial metropole to local elites and a compelling narrative of social change, but it avoided the violence that characterized France and Russia. Brinton noted that the “Declaration [of Independence] marked the victory of the radicals—I will not call them extremists—over the moderates. Our revolution can still arouse in us emotions not aroused by other revolutions.” Footnote 57 Perhaps mindful of the sensitivities of his audience, Brinton carefully noted that the American colonists had created a revolution for territorial expansion to support a growing nation and not to spread a “revolutionary faith.” Footnote 58 He also admitted there was “a general overall feeling among good solid Americans—since our own revolution is so long past—to ennoble their own revolutionary past but to dislike current ones as not so noble. England is a very nice example of such a tendency. They have even tried to forget the fact that they once cut a king's head off. They don't like to be reminded.” Footnote 59

After Brinton's testimony Fulbright steered the discussion, asking questions about the success ratio of modern revolutions and segueing quickly into questions about the U.S.'s interventionist tendencies. Brinton claimed that in the Mexican Revolution (1910–1920) a stable, democratic polity developed because the Americans had not interfered. Fulbright pressed him: “Is it true that in most of our interventions we haven't been very successful in trying to bring about a revolution and the creation of a better society?” Brinton hedged, responding that the nation's interventions had mostly been in the Americas and did not necessarily “count,” dismissing “the conventional opera bouffe South American revolution.” In Brinton's estimation, “where we have attempted to intervene, notably at present in the Vietnam revolution which I regard as a very complicated one indeed, at the moment we seem not to have been successful.” Footnote 60

At this point Al Gore, Sr. (D-TN) inquired about the role of “esprit gospel” and the “dedications of faith and ideology,” which were so central to the spread of revolutionary movements. Gore was “rather proud of the American evangelical spirit” and the proverbial shot heard around the world at Lexington and Concord in April 1775. Linking revolutionary and religious fervor, Gore's comments pointed to a fundamental aspect of American political thought: the U.S. had the “most aggressive religious culture in modern days … having spread its influences to the darkest most spots of every continent.” Footnote 61 In Gore's words, Americans “have the best and we insist that our sense of values [are] superior and, therefore, we want to make them available. We are a little impatient when people do not accept them.” Yet even Gore admitted that current attempts to spread these values to Vietnam had run into a series of formidable philosophical and material obstacles. Americans were now “in confrontation with another aggressive culture that is inspired by a sort of materialistic fanaticism. I can't quite call it religion.” Perhaps Americans had erred in spreading the gospel of revolution around the globe, since modern revolutions were so expansionary and aggressive, and since modern revolutionaries seemed unappreciative of American solicitations. Footnote 62

Brinton agreed that the “gospel” of a revolution was a critical factor. Earlier, he had inveighed against the prevailing trend toward scientism and quantification, which detracted from a true understanding of what motivated political action. Brinton emphasized the importance of ideology in the mobilization of revolutionary sentiments, since ideas distinguished “a revolutionary crisis from ordinary political, military, or economic crisis.” Footnote 63 Though Cold War Americans derided ideology as the preserve of communists and radicals, Brinton criticized “current American opinion which tends to minimize the importance of ideas as not being hard boiled, concrete, and realistic.” Footnote 64 For this reason the emerging “national liberation fronts, and so forth, and so on, mostly in Asia and Africa” were the classic revolutionary type, that is, “mixed socioeconomic and nationalist but with nationalism at its core.” Footnote 65 The crux of the matter was whether self-determination and democracy were Western or Eastern principles. As Gore saw it, the U.S. attempted to “make available Western values to Southeast Asia, [. ]attempting to measure our problem there by Western values.” Gore had “serious doubts that Western values [were] an adequate index for policy.” Brinton replied that self-determination—“those famous words”—were “good American words” for an American context, yet the desire to create affective groups above the level of kin or family was a natural desire that “went back to the tribal.” The goal of an independent nation-state was simply the most recent iteration of this longstanding aspiration, one Americans were "running up against now” in the decolonizing world. Footnote 66

George Aiken (R-VT) finally turned the discussion to Vietnam, asking if “what is going on in Vietnam today is a revolution, a bona fide revolution, or is it a widespread Communist conspiracy to take over the world? How would you treat those two influences?” Footnote 67 Aiken was already infamous for allegedly stating in 1966 that the United States should declare victory in Vietnam and get out. Footnote 68 Brinton responded that the idea of a global communist conspiracy for world domination did not “make much sense in view of the relations between Russia and China, to say nothing of some of the minor communist states and Yugoslavia and indeed North Korea as far as that goes.” There was no doubt that Ho Chi Minh was a communist, but Ho was closer to a Tito, more concerned with building a nationalist program than executing orders from Moscow. Footnote 69

Next, Aiken inquired about the wave of anticolonial resistance movements sweeping Africa, Asia, and Latin America, and the fear of revolutionary violence in places such as Congo, where “revolution has been going on all the time,” or in other volatile places like Nigeria, Thailand, or Burma. Footnote 70 Despite the common belief that poorer nations were most susceptible to both communist influence and internal disorder, Brinton did not believe that poverty alone was a catalyst for revolution. Earlier in his testimony Brinton explicitly stated that revolutions did not occur among the “miserable and downtrodden and the desperate,” but among “people who have enough to want more.” Footnote 71 And indeed, revolutions would proliferate now that a critical mass of once-colonized peoples had “enough to want more,” and were willing to adopt Marxism to get it. The world was in another age of revolution: “One can break out most anywhere really and especially in the underdeveloped nations or whatever you call them. I think there is no question about it.” If revolutions were now an unavoidable part of the contemporary geopolitical landscape, how should the U.S. respond? Brinton offered “no simple formula” other than prudence. The U.S. could not support or “bless” every case of revolutionary upheaval there could be no endorsement of “what Castro did in Cuba,” for example, but too much counterrevolutionary interference was also a flawed strategy. Returning to his medical metaphor, the United States should approach each case of upheaval like a wise physician attending to an illness, following the Hippocratic oath of “do no harm.” Footnote 72

Fulbright also wanted Brinton's expertise on the subject of whether communism led to excesses such as purges and show trials, and whether a period of political violence was characteristic of revolutions in general, or of the communist variant specifically? Footnote 73 Brinton was unequivocal that violence was a part of todos revolutionary processes. The United States had to manage the increasing complexity of the international system and the difficulty of maintaining a balance of forces amenable to American interests. Vietnam and the rise of sociopolitical revolutions in other parts of the world only compounded this issue.

Clifford P. Case (R-NJ) wondered if Brinton “would just sort of speculate about the relationship, if any, between local revolution and the larger question of the balance of power”:

We vacillate back and forth between thinking how horrible it is that we, a great power, are destroying a little country at the tip of Southeast Asia, and being concerned about whether we do not have some responsibility for the maintenance of the balance of power, or the balance of tensions, which, in the imperfect world in which we live, provide our only semblance of stability.… Footnote 74

Brinton replied that the international system simply had too many moving parts to provide a neat answer, “especially since the freeing of the colonies and so forth and so on—and what part changes in them will play in the big balance is really awfully hard to estimate.” Footnote 75 Brinton was suspicious of Dulles and the domino theory, instead agreeing with Walter Lippmann, who argued that a true balance of power would require China to have as much influence in Asia as the U.S. did in Latin America. Footnote 76

In his final words, Brinton appeared to share Fulbright's exasperation with the U.S.'s Vietnam policy, though couched in a far more reticent tone. It was doubtful that American national security could be fundamentally affected by a small and “unimportant” territory, and Vietnam was not a “sufficient menace” to commit U.S. forces to mainland Asia. Ultimately, Brinton questioned “the American tradition of virtuous interference.” Even in situations that were intensely problematic, such as apartheid South Africa, “officially even when we are outraged by what goes on in South Africa we should do nothing.” Footnote 77 Brinton's advice was that Americans “should work against our irrational attitudes toward revolution and above all also attempt to weaken the delusion of the potency of our virtues.” The United States must lose its presumption of “omnipotence” and be prepared to address crises in the global order on a case-by-case basis. This included revolutionary movements, no matter how communistic or distasteful:

Brinton: We should put up with a world that isn't our own making. We have to anyway.

Fulbright: In other words, if I understand you fairly, we shouldn't be sympathetic only to revolutions that are in our own image we should allow revolutions that may be different to ours to work themselves out. ¿Es eso correcto?


Family tree of J. William FULBRIGHT

Fulbright was born in Sumner, Missouri, the son of Roberta (née Waugh) and Jay Fulbright. In 1906 the Fulbright family moved to Fayetteville, Arkansas. Fulbright's parents enrolled him in the University of Arkansas's College of Education's experimental grammar and secondary school.

Fulbright earned a history degree from the University of Arkansas in 1925, where he became a member of the Sigma Chi fraternity. He was elected president of the student body and a star four-year player for the Razorback football team from 1921 to 1924.


Fulbright later studied at Oxford University, where he was a Rhodes Scholar at Pembroke College, graduating in 1928. He received his law degree from The George Washington University Law School in 1934, was admitted to the bar in Washington, D.C. and became an attorney in the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice.


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Geographical origins

The map below shows the places where the ancestors of the famous person lived.


Who Are Fulbright Alumni?

The Fulbright Association extends the Fulbright international exchange into a lifelong experience for U.S. alumni. We connect alumni and friends of the Fulbright program through lifelong learning, collaborative networking, and service projects at home and abroad.

Established on February 27, 1977, the Fulbright Association is the U.S. alumni organization of the Fulbright Program, representing 140,000 U.S. alumni – 70 years of Fulbrighters since the program’s inception – and friends of international education. We support a thriving alumni community that helps increase visibility for the Fulbright effect and helps preserve Fulbright exchanges for future generations.

Through our 54 local chapters, the Fulbright Association hosts more than 230 regional and national programs each year for visiting Fulbrighters and alumni throughout the United States. Programs include educational events, career development seminars, music and art presentations, networking events, volunteer activities, and more.

We are a hub for Fulbright alumni to connect in meaningful ways, as well as a community of friends of Fulbright who support international education and cultural understanding around the world.

Mission, Vision, and Values

MISSION
To continue and extend the Fulbright tradition of education, advocacy and service

VISION
To be a catalyst for a peaceful and interconnected world inspired by international educational exchange

VALUES
We respect all peoples and cultures, value diversity and are committed to international education and mutual understanding

Nuestra historia

In 1976, the Board of Foreign Scholarships (now the J. William Fulbright Foreign Scholarship Board) convened regional Fulbright alumni meetings to celebrate the 30th anniversary of the Fulbright Program. The Fulbright Association grew out of resolutions adopted at those meetings. The late Arthur Power Dudden became its founding president.

Senator J. William Fulbright encouraged alumni to create an active constituency for the Fulbright Program that would educate Congress and the public about the benefits of advancing increased mutual understanding between the people of the United States and those of other countries. He wanted U.S. alumni to welcome and exchange ideas with Fulbrighters from abroad. Through our programs and advocacy campaigns, the Fulbright Association sustains these goals for future generations of Fulbright alumni and supporters.

Who are the Fulbright Alumni?

Fulbright alumni are leaders in every field and represent over 165 countries. They are global change-makers in politics, business, science, education, and the arts. Our ranks include 82 Pulitzer Prize winners, 59 Nobel Prize laureates, 37 current or former heads of state or government, 70 MacArthur Foundation Fellows, and 16 Presidential Medal of Freedom recipients.

Our alumni come from thousands of public and private universities in the United States and abroad. Fulbrighters are committed to advancing mutual understanding, tolerance, and peaceful relations worldwide.


Ver el vídeo: The Role of Congress in Foreign Policy 1971  with J. William Fulbright. ARCHIVES